Collateral Murder Op Ed /
Who hasn’t seen the video of the slaughter of more than a dozen civilians by U.S. army helicopters that took place in a Baghdad residential district on July 12, 2007? Two of the victims, 22-year-old photographer Namir Noor-Eldeen and his colleague Saeed Chmagh, a 40-year-old driver, were employed by the Reuters Baghdad bureau. After almost three years and numerous attempts by Reuters to obtain the video under the Freedom of Information Act, the document was sent to Wikileaks, who deciphered and subtitled the original 39-minute video file before analyzing, editing and captioning a 17-minute cut. The two files, along with other supporting documentation that includes the U.S. military’s Rules of Engagement (ROE’s), were posted on a dedicated website provocatively titled Collateralmurder.com. The video has now been watched by about 7 million people on YouTube.com.
In response to the sheer horror felt by most ordinary people who have seen the images there has been a studious attempt by the Pentagon and, on its behalf, by most sections of the media to downplay the video’s importance and call into question the idea that an informed opinion can be made on the basis of its content. Viewers have rightly responded with revulsion to the words and deeds of the helicopter crews in the video but have been told that they should not be surprised by what they see: this is war, this is how it looks and these kinds of incidents – though regrettable – are simply mistakes that everybody in the military does their very best to prevent. Also, according to U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, what we see in the video lacks context. He is right in that regard but background and perspective do not serve him well.
July 2007 was the height of what became known as “The Surge” in Iraq. The U.S. military escalation was sold to the American people as a necessary effort to create a secure environment in which “political reconciliation” could take place among the Iraqi leadership and socio-political factions. This troop increase, we were told, would be accompanied by the implementation of counterinsurgency best practices as laid down by the new, much vaunted U.S. Military Counterinsurgency Manual. This had earlier been rolled out, to great media attention, with talking points such as “lessons learned,” “population-centric,” “secure the population,” and “population friendly.” Billed as a radical departure from the previous Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force, it was designed to direct a public emphasis away from a “kinetic” approach to the war.
The reality was somewhat different. “The Surge” was a calculated effort to keep an increasingly disillusioned and American casualty-averse public in the U.S. engaged in what they saw as an unwinnable war. Best counterinsurgency practices were a smokescreen for a ramping up of violence – particularly in Baghdad – to unprecedented levels. This included a 500% increase in the use of air strikes by the U.S. Air Force alone. As we see in the video, eliminating possible threats from a distance was preferable to risking American lives on the ground. Why send a company of infantry to explore an ambiguity when it can be eliminated by a missile strike or a few bursts of cannon fire? According to the Department of Defence’s statistics, June and July of 2007 were the high tide of violence in its part of the war in Iraq. In this accommodating environment I cannot help wondering just how many similar incidents occurred during this period.
Another slice of context that would serve us well would be to know the identity of the whistleblower – the insider (for he/she surely was inside) who sent the material to Wikileaks. What motivated him or her? From reviewing documents released by the Pentagon after Wikileaks posted the video, it seems that the 39-minute file may be the same one put together by the helicopter unit in the immediate aftermath of the incident and handed, on a CD, to the officers charged with conducting the internal investigation. This raises more questions: is this from one helicopter or both? Were both helicopters recording the mission? If so, what else would we see if both recordings were being played side by side?
The video we see begins only one minute before the group of men in the courtyard become the focus of the helicopter crew’s attention. Critically, it omits what they claim was a request for assistance by troops in the area who were being fired on. Where is that footage and why was it not included in the edit? And why didn’t the investigators request the full record of that morning’s flight?
There have been claims that the leaked video segments do not adequately depict the situation on the ground that day. If that were the case, the additional footage would, presumably, clear up any false impressions. Judging by a combination of what we hear of the ground unit’s radio traffic and the overall demeanour of the Iraqi men we see strolling nonchalantly in the courtyard, it is difficult to imagine any sort of significant action taking place close by. The argument that the actions were justified because small arms fire could be heard in the vicinity does not stand up. The sound of small arms fire does not necessarily equal a gun battle in progress. There are armed men in the courtyard – one carrying some sort of Kalashnikov (AK47) variant and the other with a machine gun, either an RPK or a PKM – and both are relaxed. It does not look like they are ready to use the weapons or are moving toward positions where they would likely use them. If they are aware of the helicopters overhead they do not seem to regard the aircraft as a threat even though they are openly carrying weapons.
The pilots – and many people who have viewed the video since its release – assume the men to be “insurgents” but remember that besides occurring at the height of “The Surge,” these events took place during a raging civil war in which residential districts and, all too often, mosques were the targets of bombers and gunmen. Many districts set up armed neighbourhood watch groups to protect themselves against attack by erecting checkpoints to control access, and most mosques in the city had some form of guard force. There is a possibility – given the proximity of the mosque – that the armed men could have belonged to either of these groups. Even then, it is not these men who trigger the request by the Americans for permission to open fire; it is what we now know to be Namir’s cameras, one carried by himself, the other by Saeed. These “weapons” become the centre of attention.
Once he is given the go-ahead, we hear the pilot’s excitement rise considerably and the aircraft begins to move in for the kill. Suddenly the “weapon” loses its previously ambiguous status and becomes a rocket propelled grenade launcher (RPG), even though it looks nothing like one and is not in any way being handled like one. With an increasingly urgent tone in his voice, the pilot says that the man on the corner is about to open fire, but now takes the time to traverse back to the other side of the corner instead of taking immediate action to prevent the man on the corner from firing. He clearly has more interest in eradicating the group than eliminating what he has identified as the threat to other U.S. troops because, as he later says, he “didn’t want all those fuckers to run away and scatter.”
The men in the courtyard are cut down by repeated bursts of cannon fire from the helicopters and then, when the dust clears, we witness the spectacle of a wounded survivor locked in the cross hairs of the gun camera. We hear the radio voices taunting and goading as they express their hope that he will reach for a weapon that exists only in their own minds.
If what we have just seen leaves any room for doubt as to the impropriety of the helicopter crew’s actions, it is soon dispelled. Having twice said that they can see no weapons, the crews repeatedly insist that they be granted permission to kill the wounded man and the three courageous Iraqis who have come to give him assistance. When the killing is sanctioned it is on the understanding that a wounded man and others who are carrying out a humanitarian act will be put to death.
We learn later that there are children in the car. Although nothing suggests that the helicopter crews knew this at the time, there is certainly enough evidence of their heartlessness to suspect that it would not have prevented them from committing the crime. By their own words, to these Americans an Iraqi father is such a subspecies that he brings his children to a battle.
Later in the video one of the helicopter crews fires a second missile into a building just as rescuers are entering it to help the victims of the first missile attack. Shortly afterwards a third missile is launched into the same building.
By the end of the day the military authorities in Baghdad knew that two of the men who had been killed were Reuters employees, and said that the military had opened an investigation. The documents made available by the Pentagon in response to the Wikileaks release are supposedly what resulted. They do not amount to an investigation. Instead, they show a superficial internal inquiry carried out by officers of the same command who seem highly sympathetic to those they are supposed to investigate, and are clearly indisposed to doing what is necessary: thoroughly exploring the incident to establish the truth. They simply provided the helicopter crews with an opportunity for self-exoneration.
Looking at this report – which, astonishingly, places the blame for the incident on the Reuters staff – it is little wonder that members of the American military have come to understand that the unlawful killing of an innocent Iraqi or Afghan carries little danger of scrutiny or punishment. The clear signal that this sends out is that actions such as we have seen in this video are deemed acceptable conduct and can be carried out within a cocoon of impunity.
Judging from what I have seen since the video entered the public domain, the editorial boards of the newspapers in the United States and Great Britain have remained shamefully silent. Where we would expect a muscular and well-argued demand for an official investigation conducted by competent, qualified investigators, we have heard nothing. The only organisations to express such an opinion have been press groups like the Committee to Protect Journalists and the International Federation of Journalists, leaving the impression that the only reason to be troubled by these killings is that journalists are among the dead. It is almost certain that it is the only reason we now know what happened that day.
The full 39min 14sec video:
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